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NOTES
REGULATION OF PYRAMID SALES VENTURES
In recent years, promoters of pyramid sales ventures have infected
the public with a virulent new strain of get-rich-quick investment fever.
Analogous to the familiar chain letter in that realization of profits by
any one venturer is dependent upon participation by an ever-increasing
number of new investors, the pyramid scheme is propagated through
successive sales of some type of franchise. Illustrative is the sale of a
franchise which licenses an investor both to sell a consumer product and
to sell similar franchises to new participants.- For each franchise sold,
the investor is permitted to retain as a commission part of the franchise fee
paid by the new venturer. Since the franchise fee approaches the sum
which the investor could reasonably hope to realize by retailing the
product, it is apparent that each investor's expectation of gain is derived
primarily from the right he acquires to sell similar franchises to others,
not from the right to retail the consumer product which forms the basis
of the franchise.
Unfortunately, the pyramid sales scheme shares with the chain letter
the inescapable consequence of eventual exhaustion of the supply of
potential investors. Consequently, despite promoters' promses to the
contrary, many investors realize little or no return on their investments.
The certainty of loss to later participants suggests that the public be
afforded some protection, such as that provided under the Mail Fraud
Act with respect to chain letters. 2 This Note will evaluate the prospects
for effective regulation of pyramid sales schemes under the federal securities acts, under various state laws, by the Federal Trade Commission,
and under proposed federal legislation.
1. For a detailed description of a pyrarmd scheme of tins type, see Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531, 532-36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). See also TiME,
July 16, 1973, at 5i.
A franchise has been defined as "a contract between the francusor and the franchisee
wherein the franchisor permits the franchisee to use the franchisor's name, products or
processes in consideration for the franchisee paying the francisor an initial fee or a
percentage of sale income.' Note, Regulation of the Franchiseas a Security, 19 J. Pun.
L. 105 (1970). A right in the franchisee under a pyramid sales venture to sell sunilar
franchises to new investors thus distinguishes such schemes from the ordinary franchise
situation.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
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THE PYRAMID VENTURE AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION

Common to all pyramid schemes is the direct dependence of each
participant for his profit upon successive participation by an ever-mcreasing number of new investors. Regulation under the federal secunties laws and various state statutes, however, is not afforded on the basis
of this pyramid trait; the determination of whether a pyrand scheme
falls within the ambit of securities laws currently depends upon other
factors, including the risks assumed by the investor and the relative control of the promoters and the investors over the management and operation of the enterprise. As a result, it is necessary to subject each pyramid
sales scheme to a detailed factual examination in order to determine
whether it falls within the scope of existing regulatory statutes.
One representative pyramid venture, Dare to be Great, Inc., is de-

scribed in SEC v. Glenn W Turner Enterprises,Inc.8 Under this type
of plan, which will be referred to as the Glenn Turner or multi-level
distributorship scheme, the promoters offer to the public a series of
contracts called "Adventures." The Adventure I and Adventure 2 packages contain various instructional materials on self-improvement or
motivation. The purchaser of an Adventure 3 or 4 contract, paying a
greatly inflated price for some additional instructional materials, obtains
the right to receive commissions on the sale of "Adventures" to others.
Specifically, the purchaser of Adventure 3 may sell Adventures 1, 2,
and 3, and the purchaser of Adventure 4 is permitted to sell all of the
Adventures, including Adventure 4.
To earn his commission, the Adventure 4 owner need not personally
procure a purchaser's signature on a sales contract. In fact, responsibilities are limited to arousing curiosity in a prospect and persuading
him to attend an "Adventure Meeting" conducted by the promoters and
over which the Adventure 4 owner has no control. The Adventure 4

owner need not even attend the meeting to receive credit for the sale
of an Adventure to a new purchaser. In summary, the Glenn Turner
scheme utilizes the franchised sale of self-improvement courses as its
conduit, requires mimmal investor effort, but permits only limited control by the investor over the sale of franchises to new investors.
A second type of pyramd venture, described in Gallion v. Alabama
Market Centers, Inc.,4 will be referred to as the Market Center or
3. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
4. 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968).
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founder-member scheme. This plan requires the investor initially to
purchase a consumer item at an inordinately inflated price. The purchaser thereby obtains the right to distribute authorized buyer cards and
to earn a commission on each sale resulting from the use of such cards
in the promoter's consumer goods store. The investor may also earn
comnssions through inducing others to make investments similar to his.
The venturer is expected to attend monthly sales meetings and to collect
and redistribute any buyer cards which are not being used regularly
Thus, the Market Center scheme requires greater investor participation
in the operation of the enterprise than does the Glenn Turner scheme;
however, the investor is somewhat less dependent upon the efforts of
third parties for his profits.
The fundamental evil of pyrand sales plans, observable in each of
the schemes described above, has been stated as follows:
[H] owever long
[the scheme] lasts, it will infallibly leave
a greater or less crowd of dupes at the end with no opportumty
to recoup their losses because the bubble has at last burst
While contemplating large gains to the original promoters and
early purchasers, it necessarily contemplates losses to the later
purchasers; losses increasing in number with the greater success
of the scheme.5
Unlike the ordinary sales of franchises, therefore, the pyramid scheme
is dependent for its success upon the exploitation of investors who must
eventually suffer losses. 6 Many participants not only invest large sums
of money 7 but also are induced to leave their prior employment; accordingly, when the bubble has burst, the investor may have lost both his
money and his job.8 Another collateral effect of such schemes is that
investors may be forced to commit fraud to obtain bank loans to pay
for their investments. Indeed, promoters of pyramid ventures sometimes
5. Twentieth Century Co. v. Quilling, 130 Wis. 318, 320, 110 N.W 174, 176 (1907).
6. This conclusion necessarily is based upon the assumption that since no additional
rights can be gamed by buying a second interest in the scheme, any given individual
will invest only once.
7. In one scheme, the initial investment often amounted to $5,000. SEC v. Glenn W
Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476,478 (9th Cir. 1973).
8. 118 CONG. REc. 16,190 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1972) (letter from Bruce A. Craig, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, to Senator Walter Mondale).
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suggest methods by which prospective members can perpetrate frauds
against banksf
Pyramid sales plans typically prey on relatively uneducated persons
who can ill afford the loss of their investments. The salesmen of the
ventures "make no attempt to search out persons with sales ability, financial acumen or other skills." l- On the contrary, many promoters
employ high pressure sales techniques to induce irrational investment
decisions made without knowledge of the risks involved. 1 With investment in various pyramid ventures estimated to range in the hundreds
of millions of dollars,' 2 the proliferation of such schemes has been characterized as possibly the most serious fraud problem currently facing
consumers.-3 The inevitability of substantial losses to later participants,
coupled with the fact that investors are unaware of the risks involved
m such ventures, clearly warrants some form of regulation.
REGULATION

UNDER

THE

SECURITIES

AcTs

One possible method of combating pyramid sales ventures is to subject
their promoters to the sanctions of the various state and federal securities acts. Several states have successfully utilized this approach,' 4 as
has the Securities and Exchange Commission in a recent federal court
action against the Glenn Turner scheme. 15 If applicable, securities laws
could provide protection for potential investors in pyramid sales ventures by forcing promoters to comply with strict disclosure requirements and by subjecting them to penalties for fraud and misrepresentation. 16
9. 118 CONG. Rac. 16,190 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1972) (letter from Warren Spannaus,
Attorney General of Minnesota, to Senator Walter Mondale). See SEC v. Glenn W
Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 479 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973).
10. SEC v. Glenn W Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F Supp. 766, 770 (D. Ore. 1972),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973)
11. For a discussion of the sales techniques frequently employed, see SEC v. Glenn
W Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1973); Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (1972).
12. BNA ANTnTRUsT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 580, at A-4 (Sept. 19, 1972) (address by
William J. Casey, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 55th
Annual Conference of the North American Securities Administrators).
13. 118 CONG. Rc. 16,188 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1972) (remarks of Senator Mondale).
14. E.g., Bond v Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 246 So. 2d 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971);
Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antnori, 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969);
State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 54 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); State ex rel.
Healy v Consumer Business System, Inc., 482 P.2d 549 (Ore. Ct. App. 1971)
15. SEC v. Glenn W Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973)
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
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PotentialEffectiveness of Securities Regulation17
A primary objective of the Securities Act of 1933 is to compel timely
disclosure of all material facts incident to the sale of a security To
this end, the Act imposes an affirmative duty to disclose and proscribes
imsrepresentation, deceit, and other sharp or fraudulent practices in
securities transactions. Compliance with the federal standards of disclosure would neutralize the selling power of the pyramid schemes' pitchmen and ultimately could prove fatal to their operations.
With lirmted exceptions,' 8 the Act requires that a registration statement be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission before any
security may be offered or sold. Section 7 of the Act requires that
a registration statement contain all material information concerning an
investment security 19 As a practical matter, such disclosure alone may
not effectively combat the pyramid sales tactic, since most buyers would
not avail themselves of the opportuity to examine the registration statement. In addition to registration requirements, however, the Securities
Act mandates that a prospectus be given directly to the purchaser prior
to or contemporaneously with the delivery of the security by the issuer,
underwriter, or dealer.2 0 Failure to comply with the prospectus require17. Since the purpose of this note is to explore the potential availability of state and
federal remedies when individual investors have suffered losses occasioned by participation in pyramid promotion activities, the textual discussion has been structured to
provide a detailed treatment of the threshold question of whether a pyramid plan constitutes a "security," with only summary treatment of the most significant effects of
such a classification.
18. Since solicitations in pyramid sales ventures normally are from the public at
large, the private offering exemption afforded by section 4(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (1970), would appear unavailable to promoters of such schemes. See generally
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 US. 119 (1953); Orrick, Non-Public Offerings of Corporate Securities-Lmitations on the Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act, 21
U. Pirr. L. Rav. 1 (1959); Patton, The Private Offering: A Simplified Analysis of the
Initial Placement, 27 Bus. LAw 1089 (1972); Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards
for the Unwary, 45 VA. L. REv. 869 (1959).
Similarly, it is doubtful that many pyramid ventures could qualify for the exemption
afforded intrastate offerings by section 3(a) (11) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11)
(1970). See generally SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961) and cases
cited therein. Since promoters are primarily concerned with finding willing buyers
rather than making inquiries about the domicile of such prospects, it is doubtful that
a pyramid scheme could operate for an extended period without someone making an
offer to a nonresident. An offer to a single nonresident renders the exemption unavailable to the entire offering. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77 g (1970).
20. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1970). The Act's prospectus
delivery requirements are imposed upon "issuers," "underwriters," and, to a limited
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ment results in liability to the purchaser under section 12(1) of the
Act."'

The application of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193422 could also have substantial impact on pyramid operations. These provisions have broad applicanon with respect to the enforcement of full and adequate disclosure
in securities transactions.2 The prohibitions of the Securities Act apply
even if an exemption from the registration requirements is applicable
or the sellers are not deemed to be underwriters with respect to the
securities. Misrepresentations provide grounds upon which the SEC can
seek an injunction against the perpetrators of the unfair tactics2 as well
as the basis for a civil action by the purchaser.25
Because pyramid sales schemes prosper primarily through the use of
half-truths and by obscuring potential risks, subjecting such enterprises
to the provisions of the securities acts clearly would result in their eventual demise. 26 Having thus explored the potential effectiveness of regulation, the discussion now turns to the critical question of the availability
of such regulation.
Availability of Securities Regulation
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
contain similar defintions of the term "security" 27 The federal statutes
extent, "dealers." The term "issuer" is defined as any person who issues or proposes to
issue any security An "underwriter" includes any person who has purchased from an
issuer (or any person controlling or controlled by the issuer) with a view to distribunon of any security, or who offers or sells for an issuer in connection with the distribution of any security Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970).
21. i U.S.C. § 771(i) (1970)
22. 15 U.S.C. §5 78a-78hh (1970).
23. For a general discussion of the scope of the anti-fraud provisions under rule
i0b-5, propounded under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see Note, SEC Rule 10b-S.
A Recem Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 860 (1972)

24. For a general discussion of the power of the SEC to seek injunctions, see 3
L. Loss, SEcuRiTiEs REGuLATiON 1975-83 (2d ed. 1961).

25. For a general discussion of civil liabilities for injuries resulting from security
transactions, see 3 L. Loss, supra note 24, at 1621-1829.
26. SEC v. Glenn W Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F Supp. 766, 772 (D. Ore. 1972),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
27. Although minor differences can be noted in the definitions under the two acts,
the relevant parts of each are sufficiently similar to be treated as identical for the
purposes of this discussion. The only relevant variation is the omission of the words
"interest or" following "any" in the Securities Exchange Act phrase "any instrument
commonly known as a 'security"' This omission, while apparently limiitmg the gen-
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were patterned after the most effective state blue sky laws then in
force; subsequent state laws have been patterned after the federal acts.2 8
29
Furthermore, many states have adopted the Uniform Securities Act,
which contains a similar definition of security 30 Because of the similarity of language and purpose among the various statutes, it has been
recognized that interpretations of the definitional sections of the state
securities laws should be applicable to the federal acts31 and that decisions
32
under either of the federal statutes should be applicable to the other.
A representative definition of security is found in the Securities Act
of 1933, which provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
knowvn as a "security," .3
The elements of this definition having potential applicability to pyramid schemes are those providing that the term "security" encompasses
(1) certificates of interest or participation in profit-sharing agreements,
(2) investment contracts, and (3) any instrument or interest commonly
known as a security The "certificate" provision appears to be of limited
value when applied to pyramid schemes, since the investor's interest frequently is not evidenced by a writing and therefore may not qualify as
eral applicability of the 1934 Act to written instruments, has no effect on the applicability of either act to pyramid sales ventures.
28. UNIolm SEcuiuTns Acr (U.L.A.) § 40i(1), Comment; I L. Loss, supra note 24,
at 456.

29. This act had been adopted in whole or in part m the blue sky laws of 27 states
at the time of this writing. For a listing of these states, see 7 UNIwoRm LAws ANNOrATm 691 (1970).
30. UNwomv SEcuamEs Acr (U.L.A.) § 401 (I).
31. 1 L. Loss, supra note 24, at 456. However, as Professor Loss notes, reference to
state court interpretations must be made with some caution since slight phraseological
variations in the definitions may provide grounds for distinction.
32. The Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of utilizing decisions under the
Securities Act of 1933 in construig the definitions in the Secunties Exchange Act of
1934. See Tcherepmn v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
33. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 XJ.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
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a certificate.3 4 Similarly, the general language of the provision as to instruments or interests commonly known as securities is of limited utility.
Although it has been held that such language must in some way expand
the definition of security,3 5 few courts have relied on thus provision,
standing alone, to classify investments as securities.", Thus, the term
"investment contract" remains as the provision most likely to subsume
37
pyramid ventures.
The term "investment contract" had no generally accepted legal
definition prior to its inclusion in the securities acts; moreover, it is
not defined explicitly therein. Nevertheless, some indication of the
scope of the term can be derived from an examination of the purpose
of the securities acts. The federal statutes express a broad remedial
38
purpose of protecting investors from inequitable and unfair practices.
Legislative history indicates that because Congress was cognizant of the
experiences of some states with attempts by promoters to avoid the
restrictions of state securities laws, it intended to define "security"
broadly in order to include a wide variety of interests. 39 Recognizing
the remedial purpose of these statutes, the courts have generally agreed
that the substance, rather than the form, of a transaction should govern
34. See I L. Loss, supra note 24, at 458, 488. As noted in a recent case involving a pyramid plan, the promoters often encourage their distributors not to require the execution
of a written contract. SEC v. Glenn W Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F Supp. 766,
770-71 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
35. The Supreme Court has rejected arguments that the rule of construction of
elusdemn generis should be employed to limit the general langage by the specific terms
of the definition. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.344 (1943)
36. It has been suggested that the several general phrases of the definition should be
read together to provide "catchalls" for various schemes. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371
F.2d 374, 381 (7th Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion), reV'd, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). Cf. SEC
v. Glenn W Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d
476 (9th Cir. 1973). The district court in Glenn Turner examined the several general
phrases of the definition individually to establish the existence of a Gecurity
37. Most courts have focused on the "investment contract" provision to bring various
schemes under the coverage of the securities acts. See Goodwin, Franchising in the
Economy: The Franchise Agreement as a Security Under Securities Acts, Including
lOb-5 Considerations,24 Bus. LAw 1311, 1314 (1969); Note, The Franchise as a Security: Application of the Securities Laws to Ouner-Operated Franchises, 11 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 228, 233 (1969).

38. The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is expressed in its title: "An Act to
provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and
for other purposes' Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74.
39. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
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the determination whether such transaction is within the regulatory scope
of the acts.4" Similarly, some courts have advocated flexible rules for
determining the existence of a security, rather than rigid formulas which
enable the unscrupulous to circumvent the law 41 Arguably, effectuation

of the purpose of the securities laws therefore requires a construction
of the term "investment contract" sufficiently broad to encompass
pyramd sales operations. Decisions of federal and state courts have
accepted this proposition to varying extents.
Federal Courts
Whether all pyramid schemes entail "investment contracts" is an
unsettled question in the federal courts. The Supreme Court has not
addressed thus precise issue, and in only one instance has a court of
appeals considered the question. 4 - However, the courts have had numerous occasions to construe the term "investment contract" in other
43

contexts.

SEC v. C.M. JoinerLeasing Corp.4 involved the sale by the defendant
of leases in certain property situated near the site of a test oil well it was
to drill. In effect, the investors in the leases financed the drilling of the
test well in expectation of substantial appreciation in the value of their
leases should the well prove productive. In deciding that the leases were
securities, the Supreme Court failed to articulate a precise definition of
the term "investment contract," instead stating merely that the sale of
the leases "had all the evils inherent in the securities transactions wich
it was the aim of the Securities Act to end." 4 5 It was held that such
contracts would be deemed securities if "they were widely offered or
dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which establish their character
in commerce as 'investment contracts.' "46
40. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n,
106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939); SEC v. Tiing Corp., 32 F Supp. 371 (N.D. Ill. 1940);
SEC v. Timetrust, 28 F Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939); SEC v. Wickham, 12 F Supp. 245
(D. Minn. 1935); Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 R2d 906,
13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); People v. Sidwell, 27 Cal. 2d 121, 162 P.2d 913 (1945).
41. SEC v. Timetrust, 28 F Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939); State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co, 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W 937 (1920).
42. SEC v. Glenn W Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
43. E.g., SEC v. Wj. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). For a compilation of federal appellate cases construing the
term "investment contract," see Annot., 3 A.L.R. FED. 592, 596-97 (1970).
44. 320U.S. 344 (1943).
45. Id. at 349.
46. Id. at 351.
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In a subsequent decision, the Court supplied a more tangible insight of
its view of the nature of an investment contract. The landmark case'
of SEC v. W.1 Howey Co. 48 involved the sale of citrus groves in Florida. The purchasers of the tracts were also offered contracts under the
terms of which a service company would cultivate, harvest, and market
the crops, and thereafter remit the net profits to the investor. In holding
that these interests constituted securities, the Court rejected the argument that there can be no investment contract when the enterprise is
not speculative or promotional in character, or when the interest sold
has intrinsic value regardless of the success of the enterprise. 49 The
Court suggested: "The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from
the efforts of others." 5o The test thus enunciated clearly warranted the
finding that an investment contract was involved in Howey Although
the Court warned that "the statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae," 51 it is possible that the test it provided can be interpreted so
narrowly as to preclude the classification of many pyramid ventures as
securities.
The initial difficulty with the Howey test is the requirement that the
investment be made in a "common enterprise." 5 Arguably, both the
investor and promoter must participate in the operation of a single
business entity to satisfy this requirement.5 3 Under those pyramid plans
in which the investor receives the franchised right to sell a product,
the promoter could maintain that the investor operates and manages a
separate legal entity pursuant to the franchise agreement and therefore
is not engaged in a common enterprise.8 5 Most courts, however, have
47 See Goodwin, supra note 37, at 1316. Professor Loss has observed that "the case
is probably destined to become the one most cited on the meamng of 'investment con" 1 L. Loss, supra note 24, at 483.
tract' under both federal and state statutes
48. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
49. Id. at 301.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Professor Long has delineated four elements of the Howey test: (1) investment
of money, (2) a common enterprise, (3) the expectation of profit or return on the investment, (4) profit generated by the promoter or third parties. Long, An Attempt to
Return "Investzent Contracts" to the Mainstreamz of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA.
L.RRv. 135, 142-46 (1971).
53. Id. at 144.
54. For a description of such a scheme, see note 1 supra & accompanying text.
55. Long, supra note 52, at 145.
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127,

rejected the proposition that functional separation is determinative of,
the relation of the entities involved and have instead examined the extent,
of interdependence among the parties. ru Applying this approach to pyramid ventures, one court has held that a common enterprise exists whenever "the economic welfare of the purchasers is inextricably woven
with the ability" of the promoters to make their enterprise successful.57
Most pyramid schemes thus clearly could be found to involve investment in a common enterprise, since the success of both the promoters
and the investors depends upon the recruitment of new investors.
A more troublesome factor in determining whether pyramid schemes
are investment contracts under the Howey test involves interpretation
of the phrase "solely from the efforts of others." If "efforts" is construed to include any ministerial participation by the investor, and
"solely" is taken literally, any promoter could avoid classification of Is
venture as one involving securities simply by requiring some nominal
participation by the investor. 8 For example, under the Glenn Turner
plan, 9 the activities of the investor in inducing prospective buyers to
attend an "Adventure Meeting" could be deemed sufficient participation,
to preclude a finding that the investor's profits are derived solely from
the efforts of others. The requirement under the Market Center
scheme 0 that the investor distribute purchase authorization cards could
have a similar effect. However, if "solely" means substantially,(1 or
if "efforts" relates to managerial or influentially discretionary functions
rather than nominal and ministerial actions,62 most pyramid ventures
could readily be held within the Howey test to involve investment
contracts.
Although the Supreme Court has not articulated a precise mterpretanon of tis component of the Howey test, various approaches suggested
56. Note, The FranchiseAs a Security: Application of the Securities Laws to OwnerOperatedFranchises,11 B.C. hom. & Com. L. REv. 228, 234 (1969).
57. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir.
1960).
58. Professor Long has noted that if the test "is followed literally, all the Howey
Company would have had to do would be require the investor to pick a single orange.
Then it could be said that he had participated, however small his contribution, m the
creation of the fund from which he received a return on his investment and the contract would not be an investment contract." Long, supranote 52, at 145.
59. For a description of this pyrarmding operation, see note 3 supra & accompanying
text.
60. For a description of this type of venture, see note 4 supra & accompanying text.
61. See Long, supra note 52, at 145-46.
62. See Goodwin, supranote 37, at 1318.
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by other courts may provide some gtudance.6 3 Blackwell v. Bentsen 4
involved facts similar to those of Howey, except that under the terms
of the service contract, the investor retained the right to direct the
marketing of his citrus crops. Without elaborating on the Howey test,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the sale of the citrus
grove tracts to purchasers who were unfamiliar with the citrus industry
and who did not exercise their right to control the enterprise constituted
the sale of investment contracts. Thus, the mere retention by the investor
of an unexercised right to participate in the enterprise may be insufficient
to preclude classification of an investment as a security 65 However,
in Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co.,6 6 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit considered a distributorship agreement for a product
designed to prevent runs in nylon hosiery The agreement clearly provided that the distributorship was to carry on the sale and distribution
of the product. It was held that because the distributor actively participated in the enterprise, no investment contract was involved. Active
participation by the investor in the enterprise, therefore, may preclude
67
the finding of an investment contract.
Of particular interest is the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises,Inc.6 s that a multilevel distributorship scheme involves investment contracts. The court
held that investor participation in and control over this type of enterprise is mnimmal and therefore insufficient to remove the venture from
the scope of the Howey test.' 9 Declining to interpret literally the term
4'solely" in considering the efforts put forth by an investor, the court
held that an investment contract may be present where there exists a
63. See Annor., 3 A.L.R. FED. 592 (1970).
'64. 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953).
65. See, e.g., Umted States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953); Note, Franchise Sales: Are They Sales of Securities?,
34 AiANy L. REV. 383, 387-88 (1970).
•66. 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969).

67. See, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F Supp. 640 (D. Colo.
1970); Romney v. Richard Prows, Inc., 289 F Supp. 313 (D. Utah 1968).
68. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
69. See SEC v. Addison, 194 F Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961). The defendant promised voluntary workers a share of profits from a venture by which defendant would
construct and utilize a device to upgrade uranium ore to be sold to the government
at large profits. With little discussion, the court held that the workers had, by their
labor, purchased investment contracts; their nonmanagerial efforts apparently were not
,considered sufficient to take the arrangement outside the scope of the securities acts.
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common enterprise and the "efforts made by those other than the investor
are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." 70 Recently, in
Lino v. City Investing Co.,71 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
adopted the Glenn Turner interpretation of Howey. "nominal or limited" participation by the investor will not preclude a finding that an
investment contract exists.
The cases which have considered the question are of limited utility
in determning whether specific pyramid schemes involve investment
contracts. There remains a conflict as to the degree of investor participation sufficient to remove an investment from the Howey requirement
that profits "come solely from the efforts of others." Moreover, most
cases which have attempted to resolve the question have failed to distinguish between ministerial and managerial participation by the investor.
Although Glenn Turner and Lino appear to reflect a broadening of the
Howey test, courts have been inclined more often to construe the test
narrowly 72 Howey itself has been criticized as "a haphazard application
73
of prior judicial language without thought to underlying policy";
specifically, it has been urged that use of the word "solely" tends toward
"5 74
a "field of mechanical mathematics, which will lead us nowhere
In light of the existing imprecision and criticism of the Howey test,
further elaboration of the meaning of the term "investment contract"
is probably forthcoming. An indication of the direction of this development and its potential impact on pyramid schemes may be found in an
examination of state court decisions, some of which have broadened
the Howey test or proposed new criteria for applying the term "investment contract."
70. 474 F.2d at 482 (emphasis supplied).
71. 42 U.SJL.W 2148 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 1973). At issue in Lino was whether a
franchise arrangement which required the investor to participate actively and significantly in the operation of the business constituted an investment contract. Although
concluding that such participation precluded the finding that the venture involved an
investment contract, the court expressed full agreement with the holding in Glenn
Turner, stating: "[A]n investment contract can exist where the investor isrequired to.
perform some duties, as long as they are nominal or limited and would have 'little
direct effect upon receipt by the participant of the benefits promised by the promoters? " Id. (citations omitted).
72. See cases cited note 67 supra;Long, supra note 52, at 137
73. Long, supranote 52, at 146.
74. Goodwin, supra note 37,.at 1319.
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State Courts
Unlike the federal courts, the state tribunals have had numerous opportunities to construe the term "investment contract" in cases actually
involving pyramid schemes. Before holding that an investment plan
involves securities, the majority of state courts have required strict compliance with the Howey test.75
Some cases have involved simple referral agreements in which a merchant agreed to pay a buyer a specified sum for each new sale resulting
from the buyer's referral of new customers to the merchant.7 , Although
furmshing a merchant with a list of potential customers represents only
a mimsterial effort by the investor, the courts generally have held that
such an arrangement does not involve a security 77 The Howey test was
applied to a founder-member or Market Center pyramid operation
by an Alabama court, which reasoned that because the investor's profits
were dependent upon his own efforts both to encourage purchases by
the authorized cardholders and to induce others to become investors, the
arrangement did not satisfy the requirement that the investor's profits
derive "solely from the efforts of others." 78 A Texas court, considering
a multi-level distributorship plan analogous to the Glenn Turner scheme,
applied similar reasoning in holding that the venture did not involve
securies. 79 Most state courts thus have found virtually all types of
pyramid schemes to be beyond the scope of the state securities acts.
A number of jurisdictions, however, have rejected the Howey test,
favoring more flexible standards to accomplish the remedial purposes of
the acts. In a well-reasoned opinion by Justice Traynor, the Supreme
Court of California introduced a "risk capital" test, under which an
investment contract exists whenever the investor's capital is subject to
75. See, e.g., Gallion v. Alabama Market Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841
(1968); Georgia Market Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969);
Goldsmith v. American Food Services, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 353, 181 S.E.2d 95 (1971);

Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 30 Oluo Op. 2d 226, 199 N.E.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1964);
Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.
v. King, 452 S.W2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
76. See, e.g., Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc, 30 Ohio Op. 2d 226, 199 N.E.2d 120

(Ct. App. 1964).
77. See generally R. JNN NiGs & H. MARSH, SEcuRrriES REG LAT ON 252 (2d ed. 1968).
78. Gallion v. Alabama Market Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968).
Accord, Georgia Market Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969).

Contra, State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc, 54 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971) (Howey
test expressly rejected) See also Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antnori, 226 So. 2d
.693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (rejecting the Howey test as too rigid).
79. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
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-the risks of the investment enterprise.tu The court held its test compatible with the purpose of the California securities act "to afford those
-who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives
in legitimate ventures." 81 The "risk capital" standard, which also has
been adopted in Oregon,82 thus shifts the emphasis of the inquiry from
the Howey stress on whose efforts generate the profits to whether the
nature of the investment is such that the investor's capital is subject to
the risks of the enterprise. s3
"The Florida courts similarly have adopted more flexible standards. In
-a series of cases involving pyramid ventures, it has been held that both
-the multi-level distributorship scheme and the founder-member pyramid4
-arrangement involve securities within the meaning of the Florida acts.8
Citing the Howey caveat that the "policy of affording broad protection
to investors is not to be thwarted by urealistic and irrelevant formulae," 85 one Florida court8 6 declined to establish any rigid test to deter-mine the existence of a security Emphasizing the nature of the agreement, the court held that to the extent the investor's profits depended
-upon the efforts of his vendor, the agreement was a security, regardless
of the fact that the investor's efforts might have enhanced the amount
f profits generated.
80. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr.

186 (1961). The promoters of a country club, having made a $400 down payment, attempted to raise the remaining capital needed to purchase a $75,000 ranch and convert
it to a country club by selling memberships in the proposed club. Investments m memberships under such circumstances were held to be securities.
81. Id. at 816-17, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
82. State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, Inc., 482 P.2d 549 (Ore. Ct.
App. 1971).
83. As the Silver Hills court observed, under the "risk capital" test an investment may
be a "security" even though investors have no profit expectation. Therefore, the investment m country club membership was held to be a security even though no return
on the investment was anticipated. 55 Cal. 2d at 816-17, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr.
at 188-89.
84. Frye v. Taylor, 263 So. 2d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 246 So. 2d 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Florida Discount Centers, Inc.
v. Antnori, 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
85. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
86. Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antmori, 226 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969). The court found no justification for a requirement that profits come "solely
from the efforts of others" an order that an agreement be found a security under statutory provisions covering interests in profit-sharing agreements. This appears to be an
example of the willingness of courts to recognize general language in securities acts
definitions as "catchalls" for various types of schemes. See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court of Hawaii has also rejected the Howey test as
an exclusive formula, finding the narrow concept of investor participanon too mechamcal.87 The court adopted a four-part standard which,
like the "risk capital" test, was designed to recognize the economic realities of securities transactions and to be sufficiently broad to fulfill the
remedial purposes of the securities acts. 8 Applying its formula, the
court held that a founder-member pyramid scheme involves investment
contracts.
Various commentators, recognizing the inadequacies of the Howey
test, have devised other definitions of "investment contract" which embrace pyrarmd investment plans.8 9 Nevertheless, although a substantial
number of alternatives have been suggested and several applied, the
Howey test remains the prevailing view
SEC Actions
As a consequence of the predilection of most courts toward the
Howey test, it seems likely that future litigation involving pyramid
schemes under the various securities acts will involve an analysis of the
limiting extent of the phrase "solely from the efforts of others." Recogmzmg the probable endurance of the Howey test, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, instead of arguing for new standards to replace
those of Howey, has suggested simply that a proper reading of Howey
indicates that only when a significant participation in an enterprise is
required of investors is an agreement beyond the scope of the securities
acts. 0 The Commission also contends that whether significant efforts
87. State v Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 54 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).

88. The test adopted by the Hawaii court was a slightly modified form of that suggested in Coffey, The Econonac Realities of a "Security"- Is There a More Meanzngful
Fornmla?, 18 W Ra-s. L. Rzv. 367 (1967). The test, as stated by the Hawaii court,
provides:
[An investment contract is created whenever: (1) An offeree furnishes
initial value to an offeror, and (2) a portion of this initial value is subjected
to the risks of the enterprise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is

induced by the offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a
reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and
above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation
of the enterprise, and (4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise
practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
54 Hawaii at 646, 485 P.2d at 109.
89. See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 88; Goodwin, Franchising Law Matures, 28 Bus.
LAw. 703 (1973); Long, supra note 52.
90. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971); SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 9387 (Nov. 30, 1971).
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are in fact required by an agreement should be determined by the degree
of managerial control exercised by the investor and the extent of his
reliance on the efforts of others for producing the anticipated returns.
The Commission's position thus is that if investors rely upon the promoters for the recruitment of new participants, their interests should
be deemed securities; moreover, investors' efforts to distribute discount
cards, to provide products for lower-level distribution, or to induce new
prospects to attend promotional meetings should not be deemed the types
of managerial functions which constitute sufficient investor control over
the invested funds to negate a finding that a scheme involves investment
contracts and hence securities. The Commission's position recently
gained at least limited acceptance in SEC v. Glenn W Turner Enterprises,Inc.9 1
Dzsadvantages of Judicially Imposed Securities Regulation
Movements by several state courts, various legal scholars, and the SEC
to supplant or modify the Howey definition of "investment contract"
in order to bnng pyramid schemes within the scope of the securities acts
seemingly are consistent with the remedial purposes of the securities
acts. If accepted by the federal courts, such measures would provide
the SEC the necessary weapons to eviscerate pyramid ventures on a
national basis. Thus, one solution to the critical problems posed by pyramid sales ventures is the reevaluation and modification of the term
"'investment contract" by the federal judiciary
Although providing a means of dealing with the pyramid problem,
this solution has the potentially undesirable effect of imposing securities
regulation on all franchise agreements. The proposed new standards for
defining "security" are couched in such terms as joint enterprise, expectation of benefit, risk capital, and investor control and participation.92
Relating to general investment characteristics, these terms describe the
elements of all franchise agreements and do not effectively differentiate
pyramid-type franchises containing referral agreements.9 3
91. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).

92. See Long, supranote 52, at 173-74.
93. See Coffey, supra note 88; Goodwin, supra note 37; Long, supra note 52; Note,
FranchiseSales: Are They Sales of Securzties?, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 383 (1970); Note,
The Franchise As a Security: Application of the Securities Laws to Owner-Operated
Franchises,11 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rnv. 228 (1969); Note, Regulation of the Franchise

as a Security, 19 J. PuB. L. 105 (1970).
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Some commentators have argued that all franchises should be subjectto securities regulation. 4 The securities acts, however, were not mntended to reach all investments, and the registration provisions could be
"ill-suited to fostering disclosure" 5 in the ordinary franchise situation.
The anti-fraud provisions might be suited to policing franchisors, but
only if any burden of registration were abrogated by statute." If franchises in general are a proper subject for securities regulation, "such
policy should originate with the Congress rather than judicial overreach." 17 Franchising involves a significant portion of the economy, 98
and the potential impact of regulation of all franchises should not go,
unconsidered through judicial haste to control pyramid ventures. If,
then, judicial action in redefining "investment contract" appears ill advised, an alternative must be sought.
MISCELLANEOUS METHODS OF CONTROLLING MISUSE OF
PYRAMID VENTURES

Common Law Misrepresentationor Deceit
There currently exist several means by which the misuse of pyramic
ventures may be controlled to a limited extent. The purchaser who discovers that he has been duped into acquiring an interest in one of these
schemes by the false promises made at some "golden opportunity meet100
Ing" 99 may have a cause of action based on misrepresentation or deceit.
To the extent that it can be proved that the purchase resulted from
reliance on misstatements which were made knowingly and with intent
to induce the sale, the purchaser may recover damages proximately reSee, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 37
Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970).
See Goodwin, supra note 37, at 1321.
Cobb v. Network Cinema Corp., 339 F Supp. 95, 98 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
98. See Note, FranchiseRegulation Under the California Corporate Securities Law,
94.
95.
96.
97.

5 SAN Diano L. R~v. 140 nn.i-6 (1968).
99. Illustrative of misleading statements made at such meetings were those involved
in Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (1972). These
included not only general overstatements of earning potential but also specific misstatements of fact, including statements that investors were earning $50,000 annually on
retail sales when in fact no distributor had ever received commissions of that amount,

and that the average monthly expenditure on cosmetics by a family of four was $17.82,
when actually the amount was less than $11.00. Such statements were held to be more
than mere "puffery"
100. For a general discussion of misrepresentation, see W PRoss.R, THE LAw oF ToRT&
683-736 (4th ed. 1971).
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suiting from such reliance. 101 Equitable relief also might be sought in
the form of rescission, reformation, or the imposition of a constructive
trust on money received by the promoters as a result of the misrepresentation. 10 2 Furthermore, any misleading statements could provide a
defense to an action by the promoters for nonperformance of the purchaser's obligations. 03
Consumer Protecton Statutes
The current erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor has resulted in
enactment of various consumer protection statutes which may provide
a basis for controlling pyramid ventures. °4 Several of these statutes contaming general restrictions against deceptive practces'0 5 or deceptive
advertising 0 6 have been employed successfully to enjoin pyramiding
operations. 1 7 It would appear that the general language of the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act could achieve similar results.'0 " Finally,
under limted circumstances, the Uniform Commercial Code 0 and
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 10 may provide some protection to
purchasers by declaring a purchase agreement unenforceable.
101. Id. at 685-86.
102. Id. at 687-88.

103. Id. at 689-91.
104. According to a report entitled State Consumer Action-Summary '71, prepared
by White House Consumer Advisor Virginia Knauer, a growing number of states have
enacted legislation designed to prohibit deceptive practices; thirty-two states, by the
end of 1971, had adopted acts sniilar to the Federal Trade Commission Act. BNA
AXcrtRusT & TRADE REG. REP. No. 566, at A-20 (June 6, 1972). The report further states
that the year 1971 was marked by an increasing number of actions directed against
pyramid programs based on alleged violations of state laws. Id. at A-23.
105. E.g, N.J. STAT. Aim. §§ 56:8-1, -2, -8 (1964); N.Y. Exac. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1951).
106. E.g., MicH. Cozv. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.801, .802 (1967).
107. People ex rel. Kelley v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 37 Mich. App. 437, 195
N.W.2d 43 (1972); Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 NJ. Super. 216, 293 A.2d
682 (1972); State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
108. UNIFORm DEcErnvE TRADE PRAcricas Acr (ULJA.) § 2(a) (12) (condemning
as a deceptive trade practice any conduct which creates a likelihood of nsunderstanding).
109. Characterizing an agreement m a referral sales scheme as an endless chain transaction, a New York court held it unconscionable under Code section 2-302. State v.
ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
110. To the extent that the purchaser of an interest in pyramid sales schemes can be
classified as a consumer and that credit is involved in the transaction, the UCCC section
on referral sales provides the purchaser with the option of rescinding the agreement
or retaining any goods received without obligation to pay for them. UNoIRM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (UL.A.) § 2.411.
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Anti-Lottery Statutes
Because of the element of chance that inheres in referral agreements,
several jurisdictions have found that various pyramid arrangements constitute lotteries. Although state statutes only infrequently define the
term "lottery," the courts generally are in agreement upon the necessary elements."' There is, however, a conflict of authority with respect
to the application of such statutes to pyramid schemes. Some courts have
held that commissions paid participants for inducing others to join a
scheme are based not upon chance but upon the consummation of a sale
and that such arrangements therefore do not constitute lotteries." 2 In
other cases, however, it has been held that the element of chance is satisfied by the unpredictability of the number of referred prospects who
will actually buy into the pyramid plan.-" The problems involved in
judicial determinations of whether referral arrangements are lotteries
has been avoided in Florida by the express declaration in the 4state's
lottery statute that chain letters or "pyramid clubs" are lotteries."
Other State Regulation
Several states have attacked the problem directly through legislation
specifically addressed to pyramid schemes." 5 By declaring that pyramid
agreements are unlawful, such statutes permit the enjoining of such
operations at their inception before many investors have been injured.
In addition, some courts have enjoined the operation of pyramid
schemes for violations of technical statutes not specifically dealing with
the deceptive nature of the schemes. A New Jersey court, for example,
held that the multi-level distribution system of Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc. involved vertical restraints of trade in violation of the state anti111. The elements necessary to constitute a lottery generally are deemed to be (1)
a prize, (2) awarded by chance, (3) for a consideration. See, e.g., M. Lippincott Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Childress, 204 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
112. Yoder v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 202 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio Com. P1. 1963); First Discount Corp. v. Cua, 117 Ohio App. 105, 190 N.E.2d 695 (1962); De Witt Motor Co. v.
Bodnark, 169 NE.2d 660 (Ohio Com. P1. 1960).
113. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allen, 404 S.W.2d 464 (Ky 1966); State v. [TM,
Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima,
Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wash. 2d 630,409 P.2d 160 (1966).
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.091 (1961).
115. See, e.g., Wis. ADMiIisTRATIvE CODE & REGiSTER ch. Ag. 122 (1970); VA. CODE
ANNr. §§ 59.1-67.1 to 67.3 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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trust laws." 6 The Supreme Court of Virginia, upholding a ruling of
its State Corporation Commission, found the same company to be in
violation of a statute requiring foreign corporations doing business in
the state to procure an authorization certificate."17 These techical
approaches, while adding to the arsenal of remedies at the state level, are
not reliable, since their utility depends upon factors not necessarily
18
present in every pyramid scheme..
Although the various statutory and common law forms of control
available at the state level have enjoyed occasional success, their use
has not approached the elimination of the pyramid sales problem. The
statutes which provide only civil remedies are similar to the common
law convention of misrepresentation in that they enable litigation only
on an individual basis. The individual victims may be unaware of their
legal rights, unable to afford litigation, or unwilling to give up the dream
of becoming rich. Furthermore, some of the applicable criminal statutes
have been criticized because their minor penalties render prosecution
"hardly worth the effort." 119
The lack of uniformity among the statutes of different states also
contributes to the inadequacy of state regulation. The Minnesota Attorney General has noted that although his office has been successful in
actions brought against pyrand plans, the promoters have been able
to continue their operations simply by moving to neighboring states
with more permissive laws. Such operations continue to affect Minnesota by luring its citizens across the border. 20 Moreover, efforts to
116. Kugler v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 120 NJ. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (1972).
Employing reasomng similar to that of the federal courts in Sherman Act cases, the
court found violations of a section of the state antitrust act analogous to section 1 of the
Sherman Act. It was held that the distributors under the Koscot scheme were rdependent contractors and that company regulations limiting the people from whom they
could buy and to whom they could sell, the manner and method of sales and advertisig, and their freedom to associate and cooperate with other distributors were unreasonable restraints of trade.
117. Commonwealth v. Thaxton, 211 Va. 38, 175 S.E.2d 264 (1970), aff'g 1968 Va.
S.C.C. 92.

118. A pyramid scheme could eliminate the threat of antitrust action by discontinuing
regulations limiting the activities of the distributors. Elimination of such regulations,
however, would not improve the position of investors significantly Moreover, in the
absence of other regulations proscribing certain activities by foreign corporations, promoters could avoid the result in the Virginia case simply by obtaining authorization to
do business in the state.
119. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 8, 1972, at 22, col. 1.
120. 118 CoxG. REc. 16,190 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1972) (letter from Warren Spannaus,
Attorney General of Minnesota, to Senator Walter Mondale).
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control pyramid operations at the state level have been hindered by the
nonresident character of most companies involved, since the persons
responsible for company policy usually are unavailable for service of
process or discovery proceedings.32' Accordingly, adequate control of
pyramid schemes requires that state law be augmented by federal
regulation.

Federal Trade Commission
The potential for regulating pyramid sales ventures at the federal
level through the provinces of the Securities and Exchange Commission
was noted earlier.12 2 An alternative source of regulation, which already
has achieved limited success, is the Federal Trade Commission. In
recent years the FTC has exercised its apparently broad authority to
enforce federal trade regulation statutes 2 3 in attacking pyramid sales
ventures. 2 ' Specifically, the Commission has alleged violations of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commssion Act on the ground that pyramid
schemes are organized and operated "in such a manner that the realization of profit by any participant contemplates, and is necessarily predicated upon, the exploitation of others who have virtually no chance of
receiving a return on their investment and who have been induced to
participate by misrepresentations as to potential earnings." 1' It also
has alleged that the use by pyramid ventures of discriminatory pricing
techniques is in violation of the Clayton Act and that the element of
chance inherent in such ventures contravenes the public policy against
lotteries. 6
The FTC has enjoyed occasional success in its attacks on pyramid
operations, generally on the basis of consent orders to cease and desist
unlawful practices.'2 7 Because of the broad range of activities over
121. 118 CONG. REc. 16,190 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1972) (letter from Bruce A. Craig,
Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, to Senator Walter Mondale).
122. See notes 17-26 supra & accompanying text.
123. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
124. See Devour Chemical Co., TRADE REG. RaP. 20,086 (FTC Aug. 21, 1972); Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., TRADE REG. RaP. 20,019 (FIC May 24, 1972); Bestline Products
Corp, TRADE REG. RaP. 19,626 (FTC May 21, 1971); Chemical Associates, Inc., TRADE
RE. REP. 1i9,412 (FTC Nov. 27, 1970).
125. Bestline Products Corp., TRADE REG. RaP. 19,626 at 21,672 (FTC May 21, 1971).
126. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. $ 19,576 (FTC Apr. 12, 1971).
20,129 (FTC Oct. 2, 1972);
127. See Devour Chemical Co., TRADE REG. RaP.
Bestine Products Corp., TRADE Ra. RaP. 19,761 (FTC July 22, 1971); Chemcal Associates, Inc., TRADE RE. REP. 19,412 (FTC Nov. 27, 1970). But see Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 20,019 (FTC May 24, 1972)
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which it is authorized to exercise jurisdiction, however, the FTC probably cannot be expected to make the substantial progress required to
control the deceptive practices employed by the numerous pyramid
schemes presently in existence. As noted by an American Bar Association Commission study of the FTC. "The recurrent flaws of FTC
enforcement-failures of detection, undercommitment of resources to
important projects, tiudity in instituting formal proceedings and failure to engage in an effective compliance program-tend to outweigh its
occasional successes." 128
REGULATION UNDER PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Tower Proposal
Federal legislation has been proposed which could alleviate the difficulties associated with reliance on the present securities acts, various state
laws, and the FTC for regulation of pyramid ventures. Senator John
Tower has introduced a bill which would amend the deflmtional section
of the Securities Act to provide explicitly that the term "investment
contract" includes pyramid arrangements.' Under the Tower proposal, the Securities Act would provide a basis for immediate action
against pyramid operations. Furthermore, since the bill was directed specifically at pyramid referral plans, premature interference with ordinary franchises, which might result from a judicial expansion of the defmition of "security," "0 would be avoided.
Another feature of the Tower proposal is the requirement that there
be an investment before a venture can be subjected to the proscriptions
of the Securities Act. Consequently, bona fide referral plans could operate without the burdens and expense imposed by the regulatory scheme.
For example, a distributor legitimately may desire to promote ins mer128. ABA COMM'N TO STUDY TE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Report 9 (Sept.
15, 1969).
129. The bill introduced by Senator Tower was as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(1)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "As used
in this paragraph the term 'investment contract' shall include, without lirmtation, any program, contract, or other arrangement in which persons invest
in a common enterprise the returns of which depend upon inducing other
persons to participate or invest in the enterprise."
SECTION 2. This Act shall become effective on the date of its enactment.
S. 3983, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The bill was referred to the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs. 118 CoNG. REc. 14,916 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1972). It apparently never was reported out by that commttee.
130. See notes 92-98 supra &accompanying text.
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chandise by offering certain benefits to those customers who provide

him with referrals. Illustrative is the record club which offers free
records to members who provide the names of others who then are
successfully encouraged to join. To the extent that new members pay
only the retail price of the records, they have made a retail purchase
and not an investment. Since they have encountered no risks and have
not been induced to participate by the expectation of returns on any
investment, the exclusion of such an arrangement under the Tower pro-

posal is warranted.
It should be noted that Senator Tower's bill retained the term "common enterprise" 131 from the Howey test. 132 Although this term could
be susceptible to the same interpretative difficulties encountered by

courts applying Howey, any such problem could be eliminated by acceptance of those decisions holding that a "common enterprise" exists
whenever promoters and investors are dependent upon success of the
same economic entity for their profits.' 3
Mondale Proposal
Another piece of legislation designed to combat pyramid operations
has been introduced by Senator Walter Mondale. 3 4 Whereas the Tower
131.
132.
133.
134.

See note 129 supra.
See notes 47-57 supra & accompanying text.
See notes 56-57 supra & accompanying text.
The Mondale proposal is as follows:
SECTION 1. As used in this Act-(1) the term "sale or distribution" includes the acts of leasing, renting or consigning; (2) the term "goods" includes any personal property, real property or any combination thereof; (3)
the term "other property" includes a franchise license distributorship, or
other similar right, privilege, or interest; and (4) the term "pyramid sales
scheme" includes any plan or operation for the sale or distribution of goods,
services, or other property wherein a person for a consideration acquires
the opportumty to receive a pecuniary benefit (A) which is not primarily
contingent on the volume or quantity of goods, services, or other property
sold or distributed or to be sold or distributed to persons for purposes of
resale to consumers, and (B) which is based upon the inducement of additional persons, by himself or others, to participate in the same plan or
operation.
SECTION 2. Whoever, in connection with the sale or distribution of
goods, services, or other property by the use of any means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate or foreign commerce or
by use of the mails, sells, or offers or attempts to sell a participation or the
right to participate in a pyramid sales scheme shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.
SECTION 3. Any contract made in violation of section 2 of this Act is
void and any person who induces another person to participate in a pyrarmd
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proposal would subject pyramid sales ventures to regulation under the
securities acts, the Mondale bill would prohibit them. Anyone selling
or offering to sell a right to participate in such a venture would be
subject to criminal sanctions. Moreover, contracts made in violation of
the law would be void, and persons inducing others to participate in a
pyramid operation would be liable to the new purchasers for twice the
amount of any consideration paid.
Although Senator Mondale's proposal shares with that of Senator
Tower the benefits of providing a basis for immediate action against the
promoters of pyramid schemes and of leaving general franchise law
unaffected, it includes several undesirable features not present in the
Tower proposal. Under many pyramid plans, the individual investors
could be said to sell or to offer to sell the right to participate in the plan.
Thus, the criminal sanctions contained in the Mondale proposal could
be directed against the very individuals the bill seeks to protect. Similarly, as persons who induce others to enter the plans, individual investors could be liable to their purchasers for double damages. Although
the courts might construe the proposal so as to avoid these results, they
clearly follow from the literal terms of the bill.
The definitional section of the Mondale bill is also of questionable
propriety. The term "pyramid sales scheme" encompasses plans through
which participants are to receive pecuniary benefits which are "not
primarily contingent on the volume

. . .

of goods

. . .

are "based upon the inducement of additional persons

sold" and which
.

to partici-

sales scheme shall be liable to that person in an amount equal to the sum
of-(1) twice the amount of consideration paid; and (2) in the case of
any successful action to enforce such liability, the costs of the action together with a reasonable attorney's fee, as determined by the court.
An action under this section may be brought in any United States district
court within one year from the date on which such consideration was paid.
SECTION 4. Whenever it appears that any person is engaged or is about
to engage in any act or practice which constitutes a pyramid sales scheme,
the Attorney General of the United States or the chief law enforcement
officer of the State in which the act or practice occurred may bring an action in the appropriate United States district court to enjoin such act or
practice, and upon a proper showing, a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary or permanent injunction shall be granted without bond.
S. 4043, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The bill was referred to the Committee on Commerce. 118 CONG. REC. 16,186 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1972). Like Senator Tower's bill, it
was never reported to the floor. On June 4, 1973, Senator Mondale introduced "A bill
to prohibit pyramid sales transactions and for other purposes." The bill, S. 1939, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), was referred to the Committee on Commerce. CONG. REc.
10,219 (daily ed. June 4, 1973).
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pate." 1'5 Under this definition, promoters of schemes under which investors realize profits both by retailing goods and by inducing others to
invest in the enterprise could argue that the investors' profits are "primarily contingent" upon the retailing activities and that the scheme
therefore is outside the scope of the prohibitions. By failing to provide
clear standards which could promote an expeditious cessation of pyramid activities, the Mondale proposal leaves the meaning of "primarily
contingent" to be determined by the courts. Since a criminal statute is
involved, the courts might tend to construe the definition to exclude
many pyramid schemes, and the purpose of the act would be frustrated.
Furthermore, the definitional section of the bill does not require an
"investment" as an element of a pyramid sales plan. Without this requirement, the hypothetical record club agreement posited earlier' 36
could fall within the ambit of the proposal's criminal sanctions. Since
benefits to members of such a club are not "primarily contingent" on
the volume of record sales but rather depend upon the number of new

members induced to join the club, the definitional requirements for
coverage by the bill are satisfied. Hence, the Mondale proposal could
prohibit such an arrangement notwithstanding that it is a bona fide
attempt to increase sales in which benefits from referrals are not necessary in order that a club member receive his money's worth in mer-

chandise. The harm sought to be alleviated by prohibiting pyramid
schemes is the risk of loss of investments; statutory prohibition, therefore, should apply only when the purchaser bears the risk of failing to
realize benefits commensurate with the consideration he has paid.
CONCLUSION

Either Senator Tower's proposed regulation of pyramid ventures
under the Securities Act or Senator Mondale's proposed prohibition of
such schemes would constitute a considerable improvement over existing
state and federal approaches toward the menaces posed by pyramid sales
schemes. Of the two bills, however, that introduced by Senator Tower
appears the more attractive. While individual states would remain free
to prohibit pyramid ventures,' regulation under the Securities Act
would force the disclosures necessary to expose the risks to the investor
before he participates in a pyramid venture; anti-fraud provisions of
135. S. 4043, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. S 1(4) (1972).
136. See text following note 130 supra.
137. See note 115 supra & accompanying text.
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-the Act would protect against misrepresentation. The SEC, which has
-expressed a desire to regulate m this area,' 38 is familiar with pyramid
schemes and capable of bringing an expeditious termination to the un-desirable practices they entail. The Tower proposal, by leaving general
franchise regulation and bona fide referral arrangements undisturbed,
threatens only a minimal impact on the economy The potential benefits
-of protecting the public from pyramid ventures suggest prompt congressional adoption of Senator Tower's proposed amendment to the
:Securties Act.

138. See SEC v. Glenn W Turner Enterprises, Inc, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973);
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9387 (Nov. 30, 1971); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971); BNA AznTusr & TgADmREG. REP. No. 580, at A-4
(Sept. 19, 1972) (address by William J. Casey, former Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commisson, 55th Annual Conference of the North American Securities
Administrators).

